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The concept of territory as an organizing principle of national action
and responsibility extends from a nation's territorial lands and waters into
adjacent ocean areas, albeit with significant differences. From the
perspective of international law, a State has nearly absolute authority
respecting all activities, persons, and the environment-land, water,
animals, minerals, and air-within its defined land territory.' Under this
international legal model each State is a separate box on the global map.
Even within that box, however, there are caveats on the authority of the
State respecting activities, persons, and the environment. For example,
such caveats include diplomatic and sovereign immunity, the general
principle of good neighborliness, and human rights and other
responsibilities established by international law. The box analogy is also
inadequate to explain fully the realities of international communications,
trade, and cross-boundary resources (for example, rivers, air, and wildlife).
However, while in some circles it is popular to talk about the
diminishment of State sovereignty and the box metaphor at the
international level, at present this is mostly academic or intellectual
sophistry. The adventure of coming from Canada to the United States, or
t
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vice-versa--encountering the border, the security, the passport, the flags,
and the fierce assertion of nationality-belies any significant appetite for
the diminishment of the box approach by either governments or
citizenries.
As compared to land territory, national authority over its adjacent
ocean space is not as all-inclusive respecting activities, persons, and the
environment. National authority over salt water areas is best understood
as being functional, with differing balances existing between national
authority over ocean resources and ocean activities (including vessel
navigation), depending upon proximity to the coast and the nature of the
resource and/or the activity.
This Essay will focus on how Canada and the United States have
both succeeded and failed in adopting cooperative approaches to managing ocean fishery resources. A critical factor that has influenced these
efforts is the introduction of an international legal construct dictating
that States have exclusive sovereign rights respecting all marine living
resources within 200 nautical miles of their shores. Cooperative approaches to managing transboundary marine living resources between
Canada and the United States are necessary for two reasons. First, in the
case of marine living resources, the resource pays scant attention to human-constructed national boundaries. Put another way, marine living
resources challenge the entire idea of territory and boundaries. Therefore, for proper management of these transboundary resources that
benefits both States, cooperation is necessary. Second, unlike respecting
land, on salt water, as a result of each State having 200-nautical-mile
zones, Canada and the United States have areas where both States claim
exclusive national authority. These are areas where there are disputed
maritime boundaries, and they exist between Canada and the United
States on the Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic coasts.' Both for proper resource management purposes and for pragmatic "lets-not-fight"
purposes, bilateral cooperation is required.
This Essay argues that the cooperative approach that has developed
between Canada and the United States respecting marine living resources is one that simultaneously respects and ignores boundaries and
territorial constructs. Part I provides background on the emergence of the
modem international law of the sea within which States operate and cooperate. Part H investigates the two notable failures of Canada and the
United States to cooperate respecting fisheries matters that have played a
large role in shaping today's more cooperative approach. Part III details
2.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 56(1)(a), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOS Convention].
3.
See McDORMAN, supra note t.
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the existing cooperative arrangements on fisheries management in the
Gulf of Maine on the Atlantic coast and respecting salmon, halibut,
hake/whiting and albacore tuna, as well as the cooperative arrangements
on fishing activities in disputed waters and fisheries enforcement on the
Pacific Coast.
I. BACKGROUND

The starting point for understanding the reach of national authority
in the oceans is the age old legal principle of freedom of the high seas.
For the purposes here, there are the two key components of freedom of
the high seas. The first is freedom of fishing and the idea that resources
of the high seas, which historically meant primarily marine living resources, were open to capture by anyone. The second is freedom of
navigation, which is the understanding that vessels on the high seas were
subject only to the laws and authority of State where the vessel was registered.! These freedoms attached to an area known as the high seas,
defined as that area of the water column outside of national authority.
From a twenty-first century perspective, this approach to ocean space as
res communis resulted in the serious diminishment of fishing and marine
mammal stocks-the tragedy of the commons-and minimal regulation
of vessel behavior on the high seas.
It was only in the second half of the twentieth century that the dominant characteristics of the international law of the sea-these freedoms
of the high seas-were challenged. The challenge came not in undermining the freedom of the high seas per se, although this also occurred to a
certain extent, but primarily in expanding the ocean area of coastal State
authority so as to limit the area that was subject to high seas freedoms.
While this was the approach to freedom of fishing and access to ocean
minerals, this was not applied to freedom of navigation. Hence, what has
emerged is a complex situation in which national authority over offshore
resources and navigational freedoms depends upon the particular ocean
area in question.
The traditional narrative of the development of the international law
of the sea in the twentieth century categorizes and explains the developments in terms of coastal State versus maritime State interests. In this
narrative, the coastal States are those that seek to assert national authority in adjacent offshore areas and to push back the border beyond which
freedom of the high seas exists. The maritime States, in contrast, are
4.
ROBIN ROLF CHURCHILL & ALAN VAUGHAN
(3d ed. 1999); LAWRENCE JUDA, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1996).

LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA

203-08
8-48
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those that seek to constrain the expansion of coastal State authority and
to promote the freedoms of the high seas.' In this narrative, Canada, for
example, is usually portrayed a coastal State, evidenced by its enactment of a one-hundred-nautical-mile pollution prevention zone for
Arctic waters in 19706 (well ahead of its time) and, more recently, by
the arrest of a Spanish fishing trawler on the high seas adjacent to its
200-nautical-mile fishing zone in 1995. The United States, on the
other hand, is usually portrayed in this narrative as a maritime State,
primarily because of its high regard for and insistence on continuation
of freedom of navigation, for example, through international straits.'
Professor Oxman, a distinguished law of the sea expert, has suggested a different paradigm categorizing State actions: he describes those
States interested in extending national authority into the ocean at the expense of the high seas as "territorialists," and those that support high
seas freedoms-most prominently navigational rights-as "internationalists."9 Professor Oxman's approach has a nice congruence with the
themes of this Symposium and more specifically this panel, which is
entitled "Colonizing Natural Resources." Indeed, what has occurred in
the late twentieth century is coastal States' acquisition of exclusive authority to explore and exploit the natural resources of their offshore
environments, whether those resources be marine living resources, such
as fish and marine mammals, or mineral resources of the ocean floor,
such as hydrocarbons.

5.
See JUDA, supra note 4, at 213-24 (discussing how the coastal-maritime State divide played out during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III)).
6.
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act art. 3(1), R.S.C. ch. 2 (1970, 1st Supp.). The
United States strongly protested the Canadian measure. See Note from the Secretary of State
to Embassy of Canada, Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings 5 (Apr. 14, 1970) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case]; Note from the
Secretary of State to Embassy of Canada, Gulf of Maine Case, 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings 5 pt. 5
Annex 8 (Apr. 14, 1970) [hereinafter Gulf of Maine Case]; Press Release, U.S. Department of
State, Department of State Statement on Government of Canada's Bills on Limits of the Territorial Sea, Fisheries and Pollution (Apr. 15, 1970), reprintedin 9 I.L.M. 605-606 (1970).
7.
For a colorful recitation of the seizing of the Spanish vessel Estai see MICHAEL
HARRIS, LAMENT FOR AN OCEAN 1-38 (McClelland & Stewart eds. 1998). More scholarly
and insightful discussion is provided by Phillip Saunders, Jurisdiction and Principle in the
Implementation of the Law of the Sea: The Case of Straddling Stocks, in
SPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL ISSUES:

CONFLICT AND

TRILATERAL PER-

COHERENCE

382-93 (Chi

Carmody et al. eds., 2003); see also Christopher Joyner, On the Borderline? CanadianActiv-

ism in the Grand Banks, in GOVERNING HIGH SEAS FISHERIES:
AND REGIONAL REGIMES 207, 207-33 (Olav Stokke ed., 2001).

THE INTERPLAY OF GLOBAL

8.
See generally Elliot Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigational and Other Traditional National Security Concerns, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 553 (1982).
9.
Bernard Oxman, The TerritorialImperative: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT'L

L. 830, 850 (2006).
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There are presently three international legal "regimes" addressing
ocean resources. The first is national law and authority that is applicable
to marine living resources and hydrocarbon resources in adjacent waters
and seafloor. As a matter of international law, each State has exclusive
national authority respecting all ocean resources, mineral and living, out
to 200 nautical miles.'0 Where there is a legal and physical continental
shelf area beyond 200 nautical miles from shore, a coastal State has exclusive jurisdiction over the mineral resources and sedentary species in
and on that continental shelf area." The second regime is the freedom of
the high seas-freedoms of fishing and navigation-that, subject to international treaties, continues to apply in the water column beyond a
coastal State's 200 nautical mile zone.' 2 Finally, there is the international
regime that applies to the mineral resources of the deep ocean floor. One
of the innovative developments respecting global resources came in the
1960s with the concept of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" Pursuant
to the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention),
the minerals of the deep ocean floor--defined as the seafloor beyond
national jurisdiction and referred to as the "Area ,13-are "vested in
mankind as a whole."'' 4 Thus, they are not subject to national appropriation or claims 5 and their benefit is to be shared among all States (and
most particularly among developing States). The International Seabed
Authority (ISA) is to act on behalf of humankind as a whole
6 in the development of the mineral resources of the deep ocean floor.'
It is worth noting that the idea and acceptance of the seafloor as the
Common Heritage of Mankind predates the 200-nautical-mile zone.
Now lost in the mists of time, in 1970, the United States proposed a
treaty that would have recognized all natural resources of the seabed
beyond the 200-meter water depth to be "the common heritage of
mankind."'' 7 The treaty further proposed the formation of a trusteeship
zone encompassing the physical continental shelf area beyond the water
depth of 200 meters to the physical outer limit of the continental shelf,
with adjacent coastal States acting as trustees for the international

LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 56(1)(a).
Id. arts. 76-77.
Id. art. 87.
Id. art. 1(1).
Id. art. 137(2).
Id. art. 137(1).
Id. art. 137(2).
Statement from Richard Nixon, President of the United States, Statement on United
States Oceans Policy (May 23, 1970), reprinted in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAw OF THE SEA
751-52 (S. Houston Lay et al. eds., 1973); see id. at 753-68 (providing the U.S. Department
of State's summary of the proposed treaty's provisions).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
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community.'8 The United States proposed that the benefits of the
resources from this area of the shelf be shared between the international
community and the adjacent coastal State. Beyond the outer limit of the
physical continental shelf, the United States proposed creation of
"international machinery" to authorize and regulate the resources of the
deep ocean floor.' 9 The United States called for a treaty that "should
provide for the collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used for
international community purposes, particularly economic assistance to
developing countries., 20 All of this was swept away with the adoption of
"national" 200-nautical-mile zones that provided for exclusive
jurisdiction over marine living resources and mineral resources within
these zones. Arguably, the "territorialist" mentality prevailed. It was
developing States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that were the
initiators and promoters of the 200-nautical-mile zone idea.2' The 200
nautical miles diminished the area that would be subject to the Common
Heritage of Humankind. Further shrinking the area of Common Heritage
is the legal regime of the continental shelf, which allows a State to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over resources of the shelf extending
beyond 200 nautical miles. This is far from what the United States
proposed in 1970, although at a later stage the United States, Canada,
and other States adopted 200-nautical-mile zones23 and asserted national
jurisdiction over shelf areas beyond 200 nautical miles.24
To bring this general discussion back to a "today" issue, a great deal
of attention is being given the so-called "scramble" for resources in the
central Arctic Ocean. Much of this attention is media hype fueled by ill-

18.
Id. para. 7.
19.
Id. para. 8.
20.
Id. para. 5.
21.
CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 4, at 160.
22.
LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 76.
23.
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (renamed the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act), 90 U.S. Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1801-82 (1977));
Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, C. Gaz. Part H, Vol. 111, SOR/77-62, Jan. 1,
1977, at 115-20, replaced by Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, C.R.C. (1978),
Vol. XVIII, ch. 1548, at 13741-46; Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order, C. Gaz. Part H,
Vol. 11l,
SOR/77-173, Feb. 24, 1977, at 652-55, replacedby Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone
6) Order, C.R.C. (1978), ch. 1549, at 13747-50 (governing Zones 4 and 5 on the east and west
coasts and Zone 6 in the Arctic).
24.
Canada asserted jurisdiction over its adjacent continental shelf beyond 200 nautical
miles as early as the 1960s. See Barry Buzan & Danford Middlemiss, CanadianForeign Policy and the Exploitation of the Seabed, in CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAw OF THE
SEA I, 17-18 (Barbara Johnson & Mark Zacher eds., 1977). By 1974, the United States had
joined with "broad margin States" supporting coastal State jurisdiction over the continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. See ANN HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA 259-62 (1981).
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informed commentators.25 What is occurring in the central Arctic Ocean
is that States such as the Russian Federation, Canada, Denmark
(Greenland), and the United States are undertaking, at significant expense, to map and explore the Arctic Ocean seafloor in order to
determine (1) how much the seafloor comes within national jurisdiction,
based on the complex formula and procedures set out in the LOS Convention and (2) what part of the Arctic Ocean seafloor might be left to
the International Seabed Authority. 26 For all of the "scramble" and hype,
it is clear that Canada, Denmark, and the United States are cooperating
at the operational, scientific level to gather and share data.27
Another timely topic concerns marine genetic resources that exist
beyond the 200-nautical-mile zones of States. Marine genetic resources
of the deep ocean are seen by some as the twenty-first century deep seabed minerals, holding a promise of significant riches.28 There are current
international discussions as to whether marine genetic resources of the
deep ocean floor are either (1) part of the Common Heritage of Humankind and thus subject to the authority of the ISA; (2) subject to the
freedom of fishing and thus available to all States; or (3) in need of a
new regime unique to marine genetic resources of the deep ocean floor.29
It is worth noting that unlike mineral or marine living resources, marine
genetic resources on their own are without value; it is the chemicals,
drugs, or cosmetics, among other things, that may be produced based on
25.
See, e.g., Arctic Battle Heats Up as Denmark Joins the Fray, The INDEPENDENT,
Aug. 11, 2007.
26.
See generally Tavis Potts & Clive Schofield, Current Legal Developments: The
Arctic, 23 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 151, 153-67 (2008); Ted McDorman, The Legal
Framework and Recent Developments Regarding the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 nm in the
Arctic Ocean (unpublished paper presented at "The World Ocean in Globalization: Challenges
for Marine Regions" conference held in Oslo, Norway, Aug. 21-23, 2008, on file with author).
27.
See, e.g., Canada, U.S. to Team Up On Arctic Seabed Mapping Project, CBC
NEWS, June 30, 2008, www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2008/06/30/cda-mapping.html (last visited June 9, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Two Scientific Cruisesincluding Joint U.S., Canadian Mission-to Map Arctic Seafloor, (Aug. 11, 2008).
28.
See generally SALVATORE ARICO & CHARLOTTE SALPIN, BIOPROSPECTING OF
GENETIC RESOURCES IN THE DEEP SEABED: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS (2005);
DAVID KENNETH LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENETIC RESOURCES OF THE DEEP

SEA (2006); Charlotte Salpin & Valentina Germani, Patenting of Research Results Related to

Genetic Resourcesfrom Areas Beyond NationalJurisdiction:The Crossroadsof the Law of the
Sea and IntellectualProperty Law, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL L. 12, 12-23
(2007).
29.
See Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues
Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond
Areas of NationalJurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/61/65 (Mar. 20, 2006) (preparedby Juan Manuel
G6mez & Philip D. Burgess); Letter from Juan Manuel G6mez-Robledo & Robert Hill, Cochairpersons of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to Study Issues Relating to
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity Beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, to the President of the General Assembly (May 15, 2008), U.N. Doc.
A/63f79 (May 16, 2008).
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or from the genetic resources that may have value. This extra step, which
involves significant research and scientific engagement, is important and
is what makes the marine genetic resources issue particularly complex.
II. FAILED COOPERATION ON FISHING
There are two noted failures of Canada and the United States to
achieve cooperation regarding cross-border marine living resources, one
on the Atlantic coast in the late 1970s and the other on the west coast in
the 1990s regarding Pacific salmon. In the Atlantic case, the two countries were trying to overcome or deny territorial and boundary
constructs. On the Pacific coast, the rigorous adherence to territorial/property ideas led to stalemate. In both cases, the cooperation
failures hurt the fish stocks in question. On the Atlantic coast the failure
to overcome the territorialist's approach was primarily the responsibility
of the fishing constituencies and stakeholders involved. On the Pacific
coast, the strict adherence to territorialism and property was demanded
by the fishing constituencies and stakeholders involved. Both "failures"
indicate the authority of territorialism and property in shaping attitudes
and inhibiting compromise that departs from a rigid application of territorialism.
A. The Gulfof Maine in the 1970s °
While Canada and the United States have a long history of both fisheries cooperation and dispute, both States anticipated that new and
different problems would emerge after each State formally delineated
their 200-nautical-mile zones in 1977.' Bilateral attention quickly focused on the Gulf of Maine area, and more particularly, the fisheries-rich
Georges Bank. The Georges Bank, in the outer Gulf of Maine, was transformed from an area of the high seas open to fishers from Canada, the
United States, and many other countries to being under the exclusive
authority of either Canada or the United States. In 1977, the United
30.
Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from McDORMAN, supra
note t, at 135-39.
31.
For further discussion on the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act, supra note 23, and specifically the delineation of the U.S. 200 nautical mile zone adjacent
to Canada, see Public Notice 506: Maritime Boundaries Between the United States and Canada, 41 Fed. Reg. 48,619, 48,619-20 (Nov. 4, 1976) [hereinafter Maritime Boundaries],
reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1435-36 (1976) superseded by Public Notice 2237: Exclusive Economic Zone and Maritime Boundaries; Notice of Limits, 60 Fed. Reg. 43825, 43,825-29
(Aug. 23, 1995). For information on Canada's 200 nautical mile zones, see also Fishing Zones
of Canada (Zones 4 and 5) Order, supra note 23; Fishing Zones of Canada (Zone 6) Order,
supra note 23.
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States claimed that all of Georges Bank was within its exclusive authority, while Canada claimed sovereignty over the northeastern portion."
Special negotiators, appointed in 1977, agreed upon two linked
agreements: the first on fisheries33 and the second to submit the maritime

boundary question in the Gulf of Maine to binding international dispute
settlement.34 The relevant agreement here, the East Coast Fishery
Agreement was a complex deal involving "an elaborate superstructure of
entitlements, access areas, joint management authority and dispute settlement procedures."35 The key feature of the Agreement was that "there
was to be reciprocal access in perpetuity to all boundary stocks of interest to fishermen on both sides, regardless of where an agreed maritime
boundary might eventually be drawn. 36 Essentially, the eventual maritime boundary was to be largely irrelevant to the cooperative
management, including bilateral cross-border access to and sharing of,
the fisheries.
The innovative 1978 East Coast Fishery Agreement that sought to
reach beyond a territorialism/property approach was rejected by the very
people it was designed to assist. A significant portion of the fishing industry in New England was unimpressed with the insurance policy
structure of the 1979 Agreement. Opposition in the United States quickly
formed and centered on the U.S. Senate, which was constitutionally
required to provide its consent in order for the United States to ratify
the Agreement. 37 There were calls within the U.S. fishing communities
for renegotiation. Further, aggressive U.S. fishing efforts were seen by
Canada as undermining the Fishery Agreement.38 Ultimately, the fishing communities within the United States preferred the certainty of a
maritime boundary that they felt would exclude Canadians from the
Georges Bank and were willing to gamble on the result of boundary

32.
See Maritime Boundaries, supra note 31; Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones 4 and 5)
Order, supra note 23.
Agreement between Canada and the United States on East Coast Fishery Re33.
sources, U.S.-Can., Mar. 29, 1979, S. EXEC. Doc. V (1979), as reprinted in IX NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 178-212 (Myron Nordquist & Kenneth R. Simmonds
eds., 1980) [hereinafter Nordquist & Simmonds].
Agreement to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Mari34.
time Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, U.S.-Can., Mar. 29, 1979, S. EXEC. Doc. U (1979),
reprinted in Nordquist & Simmonds, supra note 33, at 167-77.
Erik B. Wang, Canada-UnitedStates Fisheries and Maritime Boundary Negotia35.
tions: Diplomacy in Deep Water, 38 BEHIND THE HEADLINES 17 (1981).
Id.
36.
See id. at 30-33, 41-44; L.S. PARSONS, MANAGEMENT OF MARINE FISHERIES IN
37.
CANADA

327-28 (1993).

38.

Id. at 31-33.
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adjudication. 39 As a result, the United States did not ratify the 1979 East
Coast Fishery Agreement.
An important factor that played a role in this saga was the novelty in
the 1970s of the 200-nautical-mile national fishing zone respecting waters that had previously been shared with foreign fishers. The "territorial
exclusivity" of the 200-nautical-mile zone held an allure for those directly involved and essentially undermined any desire to compromise.
°
B. Pacific Salmon in the 1990s4

Pacific salmon begin life in fresh water rivers or lakes, then migrate
to the ocean where they feed and mature, and finally return to their fresh
water places of origin. As a result, some salmon originating from Canadian rivers pass through Alaskan 200-nautical-mile waters on their
homeward journeys and thus may be caught or "intercepted" by fishers
in Alaskan waters. Likewise, some salmon from rivers in Washington
and Oregon enter into Canadian 200-nautical-mile waters and thus similarly may be caught or "intercepted" by fishers in Canadian waters.
Enhancing the concern about interceptions was that both Canada and the
United States endorsed that idea that for Pacific salmon where the
salmon originated, the so-called "State-of-origin," had a special relationship, akin to but not quite a property right, with salmon beyond the
national waters of the State-of-origin. Canada and the United States were
successful in having the State-of-origin principle included in the 1982
LOS Convention.41
After a long period of negotiations starting in the 1970s, 2 both
States entered into the 1985 Pacific Salmon Treaty. 3 Central to the
Treaty was the understanding that U.S. interceptions of Fraser River
sockeye and salmon from other Canadian rivers, mostly by Alaskans,
would be matched by Canadian interceptions of coho and chinook originating from U.S. rivers in Washington and Oregon. 4 In 1985, Canada
39.
See Maritime Boundary Settlement with Canada, U.S.-Can., Mar. 29, 1979, S.
ExEc. REP. No. 97-5, at 1-2 (1981); PARSONS, supra note 37, at 328; see also DAVID L. VANDERZWAAG, THE FISH FEUD: THE U.S. AND CANADIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE 89-94 (1983).
40.
Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from McDORMAN, supra

note t, at 296, 298, 301-02.
41.

LOS Convention, supra note 2, art. 66.
See MICHAEL PERRY SHEPARD & W. ARGUE, THE 1985 PACIFIC SALMON TREATY:
SHARING CONSERVATION BURDENS AND BENEFITS 67-74 (2005) (discussing these negotiations and the rejection of an earlier treaty by U.S. fishing interests).
43.
Treaty Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United
States of America Concerning Pacific Salmon, U.S.-Can., Jan. 28, 1985, T.I.A.S. 11091 [hereinafter Pacific Salmon Treaty].
44.
Gordon R. Munro & Robert L. Stokes, The Canada-UnitedStates Pacific Salmon
Treaty, in CANADIAN OCEANS POLICY: NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE NEW LAW OF THE
SEA 17, 30 (Donald McRae & Gordon R. Munro eds., 1989).

42.
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was of the view that there existed "a rough, albeit imperfect, balance" of
interceptions."5 Also central to the Treaty was the acceptance of a special
status for the "State-of-origin" that suggested, where interceptions were
unbalanced, that the State-of-origin in deficit was entitled to "benefits
equivalent" to its salmon intercepted by the other State. 6 The Salmon
Treaty was based on territorial principles and did not resolve the relationship between "State-of-origin" and the exclusivity a coastal State has
respecting salmon and other fishery resources within its 200-nauticalmile zone. Canada promoted the "State-of-origin" concept and the
balance of interceptions, or if that could not be attained, then "benefits
equivalent." The United States, or at least Alaska, asserted that the rights
of the coastal State over all fisheries resources within its 200-nauticalmile zone trumped the State-of-origin concept and that there was a lack
of certainty respecting the meaning and calculation of "benefits equivalent." Finally, the Treaty created the Pacific Salmon Commission (PSC)
as the mechanism for cooperation. 47 The PSC, composed of a U.S. and a
Canadian section, was to adopt by consensus quotas and other limitations for the salmon stocks covered by the Treaty.
When the various Annex IV management and harvesting arrangements were about to expire and renegotiation was necessary in the early
1990s, Canada voiced serious concerns with the Pacific Salmon Treaty.
Canada believed that U.S. interceptions of Canadian salmon had increased dramatically during the late 1980s, while Canadian
interception of U.S. salmon had significantly declined due to weak
salmon runs in the United States.4 ' Throughout the 1990s, Canada and
the United States remained deadlocked in their negotiations, rendering
the PSC essentially dysfunctional. The deadlock focused on the following: (1) the extent of limitations, if any, that were necessary on Alaskan
fishers; (2) whether and how interception balance (however it was defined) was to be re-established; (3) and how to implement in a practical
manner the "benefits equivalent" wording from the 1985 Treaty that
was tied to the State-of-origin concept.
45.
Gordon Munro et al., Transboundary Fishery Resources and the Canada-United
States Pacific Salmon Treaty (Canadian-American Pub. Pol'y Occasional Papers Series No.
33, 1998).
46.
See WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 183 (1994);
MICHAEL PERRY SHEPARD

& A.W. ARGUE,

DEP'T OF FISHERIES & OCEANS, CANADIAN IN-

DUSTRY REPORT OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC SCIENCES

PACIFIC SALMON TREATY: FACT OR FICTION?

No. 242,

OCEAN PASTURAGE IN THE

8-11, 33-37 (1998); Thomas. C. Jensen, The

United States-CanadaPacific Salmon Interception Treaty: A Historicaland Legal Overview,

16 ENVTL. L 363,400 (1986).
47.

Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 43, art. II.

48.

Statement of Canada, Dec. 3, 1992, in 1992/1993
8-9 (1993).
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Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 30:665

Two special efforts to overcome the Pacific salmon impasse are
noteworthy. First, in 1995, the two sides agreed on a mediator, New Zealander Christopher Beebe, to assist regarding the "benefits equivalent"
dispute.4 9 The mediator eventually withdrew without attaining success. U.S. negotiator James Pipkin indicated that the mediator withdrew
because "the two countries were simply too far apart."' Second, in 1997,
a stakeholder process was attempted and two special envoys, one from
each country, were appointed to investigate means to resolve the Pacific
salmon controversy. 5' However, in early 1998 the envoys reported that
the stakeholder process was at a dead-end and that it was up to the two
governments to resolve the dispute.
Like on the Atlantic coast a decade earlier, the fishing constituencies
and stakeholders, in this case in both States, pressed their own interests
and were unwilling to approach a compromise position. In Canada, the
State-of-origin quasi-property right in salmon ruled, whereas in the
United States (and particularly Alaska), the territorialist approach of the
salmon being present in Alaskan waters ruled. Notably, the 1985 Pacific
Salmon Treaty contained wording that supported both positions.53
III.

COOPERATIVE SUCCESSES

Not surprisingly, the fisheries cooperation failures generated a lot of
public and political attention. Less attention is paid to both the coopera49.
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada on the Establishment of a Mediation Procedure Regarding the Pacific
Salmon Treaty, U.S.-Can., Sept. I1, 1995, T.I.A.S. 12689, 2029 U.N.T.S. 307.
50.
Hearing on the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty, 105th Cong. 57 (1997) (statement of James Pipkin, U.S. Pacific Salmon Negotiator) as cited in DENNIS BROWN, SALMON

218 (2005).
51.
See id., at 159-63, 217-19; EUGENE BUCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORDER CODE
RL30324, THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY: THE 1999 AGREEMENT AND RENEGOTIATION OF
WARS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WEST COAST FISHERY

ANNEX IV 9-10 (2007).
52.
DAVID W. STRANGWAY & WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, PACIFIC SALMON: REPORT
TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FISHERIES

AND OCEANS CANADA 4 (1998). For the recommendations of the Strangway-Ruckelshaus

Report; see 1997/1998 PACIFIC SALMON COMM'N THIRTEENTH ANN. REP. 91-92 (1998).
Pacific Salmon Treaty, supra note 43, art. II(3) ("In fulfilling their obligations
53.
pursuant to paragraph (1), the parties shall take into account: (a) the desirability in most cases
of reducing interceptions; (b) the desirability in most cases of avoiding undue disruption of
existing fisheries; and (c) annual variations in abundances of the stocks."); see also Marlyn
Twitchell, Implementing the U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty: The Struggle to Move from
"Fish Wars" to Cooperative Fishery Management, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 409, 419
(1989) (explaining how both sides could find support in the treaty text because "(flishers who
feel they aren't getting enough fish and want to increase their allocation ... invoke 'equity' as
a debating point. Intercepting fishers counter that the treaty also prohibits 'undue disruption'
of existing fisheries, and therefore their allocation should not be altered.").
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tive arrangements that eventually emerged from the failures in the Gulf
of Maine (respecting Pacific salmon) and the other cooperative endeavors regarding halibut, hake/whiting, albacore tuna and enforcement. It is
these cooperative successes outlined below that define the Canada-U.S.
fisheries relationship.
A. FisheriesManagement Arrangements
1. The Gulf of Maine 4
From Canada's perspective, the loss of the East Coast Fishery
Agreement was disheartening. Nevertheless, when the United States
proposed that the two States should go ahead and have a five-person
panel of the International Court of Justice determine the location of the
maritime boundary, Canada accepted that establishing the maritime
boundary was necessary for peace on the water. The two sides agreed
that the boundary would apply to both the water column and the seafloor
and would essentially be a property divider for the purposes of national
ocean activities, but differed on where the line should fall. In its 1984
decision, the Court rejected both the Canadian and the U.S. proposed
outcomes and arguments and decided on a line that appears to split the
difference between the competing claims." The maritime boundary provides to Canada a share of the fisheries-rich Georges Bank, but not as
much as Canada had claimed. The line artificially divides management
responsibility for many fish stocks in the Gulf of Maine region between
Canada and the United States. The Court noted the long "tradition of
friendly and fruitful co-operation in maritime matters" enjoyed by Canada and the United States, stated that this cooperation "now becomes all
the more necessary ... in the field of fisheries," and challenged the two
States to join once more in such a common endeavor. 6 However, this
cross-border fisheries cooperation was slow to materialize.
In the aftershock of the boundary case, bilateral "coordination of
fisheries management strategies was virtually non-existent" with respect
to transboundary fish stocks.57 Neither side seemed interested in a repeating the East Coast Fishery Agreement experience.

54.
Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from MCDoRMAN, supra
note ", at 153-55.
55.
See Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 6; cf. id. at 285, 289, 346 (showing the maps of
the claims and the result).
Id. at 343-44.
56.
57.
Transboundary Mgmt. Guidance Comm., Maritime Region, Dep't of Fisheries &
Oceans, Development of a Sharing Allocation Proposalfor TransboundaryResources of Cod,
Haddock and Yellowtail Flounder on Georges Bank, FISHERIES MGMT REG'L REP., Jan. 2002,
at 3 [hereinafter Development of a Sharing Allocation Proposal], available at http://
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In the 1990s, however, informal bilateral science and management
contacts led to the creation of the Transboundary Resource Assessment
Committee, which was designed to coordinate and cooperate on stock
evaluations and ensure that the scientific advice used in management
decisions by both States was "based on the best available combined information." 8 In 2000, the Transboundary Management Guidance
Committee (TMGC) was established, composed of six members-two
from government and four from industry-from each State "to provide
non-binding guidance" respecting harvest levels and national catch allocations for cod, haddock, and yellowtail flounder in the Gulf of Maine
boundary area. 9 Since 2003, the TMGC has annually recommended the
total allowable catch (TAC) and the sharing allocations between Canada
and the United States, for the fisheries located within that part of Georges Bank through which the maritime boundary passes.6° The work of
the TMGC is not based on a bilateral treaty and hence can be described
as legally informal; nevertheless, the result is cross-border collaboration
of fishing effort that has been a long time in coming.
6

2. Pacific Salmon '
In June 1999, Canada and the United States reached an agreement
that provided a multi-year resolution of the Pacific salmon dispute. 6 The
1999 Agreement did not supersede or replace the 1985 Pacific Salmon
Treaty but rather contained new management arrangements that replaced
the expired arrangements in the 1985 Treaty. Critical to reaching the
1999 Agreement was the fact that Canada and the United States both
accepted the importance of conservation and sustainability of the Pacific
salmon resources.63 In Canada's case, adopting conservation as its primary negotiating objective replaced its long-standing goal of attaining an

www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/science/tmgc/background/FMR 2002_01.pdf (last visited June 2,
2009).
58.
Development of a Sharing Allocation Proposal, supra note 57, at 4. See generally
Emily Pudden & David VanderZwaag, Canada-USA Bilateral Fisheries Management in the
Gulf of Maine: Under the RadarScreen, 16 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL L. 36, 37
(2007).
59.
Development of a Sharing Allocation Proposal, supra note 56, at 5-6; Pudden &
VanderZwaag, supra note 58, at 37.
60.
Pudden & VanderZwaag, supra note 58, at 38-40.
61.
Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from MCDORMAN, supra
note t, at 303-04.
62.
Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Regarding Comprehensive Agreement Between the
Parties Related to the Pacific Salmon Treaty, in 1997/1998 PACIFIC SALMON COMM'N, FIFTEENTH ANN. REP.

114, 120-69 (1998).

63.
Donald McRae, The Negotiation of the 1999 Pacific Salmon Agreement 27 CAN.U.S. L.J. 267, 270-71 (2001).
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equitable balance of interceptions! ' Essentially, the two countries accepted that an agreement placing some constraints on salmon fishing
activity, irrespective of achieving a balance of interceptions, was better
for the salmon stocks than no agreement at all. The Canadian negotiator
of the 1999 Agreement has noted that the Agreement "is technically
complex," and is "a functional arrangement" that "often ...was drafted
by scientists" and, therefore, is "written for the people who have to administer it."6
Two key elements can be noted. First, the centerpiece of the new
arrangements is abundance-based management, described by the negotiators of the 1999 Agreement as a "new conservation-based
approach."6 The idea was that harvest rates for the various salmon
stocks would be set based on the stock's actual abundance rather than
on pre-determined "ceilings," as had been applied by the 1985 Treaty.67
The national shares of the harvest would be determined as a percentage
of or in relation to the actual abundance of a specific stock. It was
hoped that abundance-based management would create sufficient incentive for both States to conserve and enhance stocks, in order to increase
future yields. Second, in the 1999 Agreement the United States committed $140 million for two trust funds, with the interest to be used to
restore habitats, improve scientific information, and enhance wild stock
production.68 While unstated in the 1999 Agreement, it was understood
the imbalthat the U.S. financial commitment was related to redressing
69
ance in salmon interceptions that had existed in the 1990s.
On the central issue of the balance of salmon interceptions, one
commentator writing in 2007 surmised that: "Both parties appear comfortable with the equity achieved under harvest regimes of the 1999
and no particular concerns related to overharvesting have
Agreement,
70
arisen.

'

64.
BUCK, supra note 51, at 14 ("At the heart of the new accord was agreement between
the parties to focus on conservation and habitat protection, rather than division of shared
salmon stocks."). See generally Ted McDorman, A CanadianView of the 1999 Canada-U.S.
Pacific Salmon Agreement: A Positive Turning Point?, 6 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L. L. & DisP.
RESOL. 99, 101-02 (1998).
65.
McRae, supra note 63, at 273.
Letter from Donald McRae, Chief Negotiator for Canada, and James Pipkin, Chief
66.
Negotiator for the United States, to the Governments of Canada and the United States, (June
23, 1999), in 1999/2000 PACIFIC SALMON COMM'N FIFTEENTH ANN. REP. 109, 109-10 para. 7
(2001).
See McRae, supra note 63, at 273-74; see also BUCK, supra note 51, at 13.
67.
68.
McRae, supra note 63, paras. 3, 6, attachment C ("Northern Boundary and Transboundary Rivers Restoration and Enhancement Fund and Southern Boundary Restoration and
Enhancement Fund").
See Buck, supra note 51, at 19; McRae, supra note 63, at 275.
69.
70.
Buck, supra note 51, at 22.
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Subsequent to the 1999 Agreement, the PSC has worked well with
the Canadian and U.S. sections, reaching agreement on a number of matters, including a Southern Coho Management Plan in 2002." More
importantly, in May 2008, the Commission announced that it had
reached accord on new management arrangements to replace the expiring 1999 Agreement.72 Interestingly, the proposed 2008 arrangements
include that the United States is to provide to Canada $30 million dollars
to be used "for a fishery mitigation program designed ... to reduce effort in [Canada's] commercial salmon troll fishery,"' 3 located off the west
coast of Vancouver Island. One representative of the trollers association
has complained that the $30 million dollars is a "buyout" and has raised
issues of74 "sovereignty," stating that "you don't sell your natural resources."
3. Pacific Halibut

75

Canada-U.S. agreements regarding Pacific halibut date back to
with the most recent complete text being the 1979 Protocol to the
1953 Halibut Convention.77 Until 1979, the halibut management approach involved having closed fishing seasons, by-catch regulation, and
controls on the numbers of vessels that Canada and the United States
could authorize to engage in the fishery. With the adoption of the
200-nautical-mile zones, the 1979 Protocol phased out reciprocal fishing
along the coasts of each State, which resulted in the territorialist ap1923,76

71.

Pacific Salmon Comm'n, Southern Coho Management Plan, in 2001/2002 PACIFIC
143, 149-53 (2003); Pacific Salmon Commission Annual Meeting, in 2001/2002 PACIFIC SALMON COMM'N, SEVENTEENTH ANN. REP. 8,
SALMON COMM'N, SEVENTEENTH ANN. REP.

10 (noting the adoption of the Southern Coho Management Plan) (2003).
72.
Press Release, Pacific Salmon Comm'n, New Bilateral Agreement (May 22, 2008),
available at http://www.psc.org/pubs/AnnexIV/AnnexIVPressRelease22May08.pdf (last visited June 9, 2009).
73.
Letter from David Balton, Deputy Head of Mission of Canada, to Condoleeza Rice,
U.S. Secretary of State (Dec. 23, 2008), available at http://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/
ViewTreaty.asp?TreatyID= 105133&bPrint=True&Language=0 (last visited June 9, 2009).
74.
Mark Hume, U.S. Salmon Payment "A Buyout," GLOBE & MAIL, May 23, 2008, at
AI, A6 (quoting Kathy Scarfo, head of the West Coast Trollers Association); see also Justine
Hunter, Salmon Deal Dells Out Fishermen, Angry B.C. Trollers Say, GLOBE & MAIL, May 24,
2008, at AI4.
75.
Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from McDORMAN, supra
note t, at 312-14.
76.
See Convention Between Canada and the United States for the Preservation of
Halibut Fisheries of the Northern Pacific Ocean, U.S.-Can., Mar. 2, 1923, T.I.A.S. 2900, 32
L.N.T.S. 93.
77.
See Convention for the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering
Sea, Mar. 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 5, as amended by Preservation of Halibut Fishery Protocol, Mar.
29, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 2483 [hereinafter Halibut Fishery Protocol].
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proach-fishers from each State could harvest halibut only in their national waters.
The International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC), composed of
three members appointed by each country, has broad authority to study
and manage the Pacific halibut fishery and to regulate all halibut found
in the Pacific waters of the United States and Canada.78 The IPHC is empowered to do the following: establish open and closed seasons in each
area; limit the size of the fish and the quantity of the catch to be taken
from each area; regulate incidental catch; establish the size and character
of halibut fishing appliances to be used in any area; and make regulations to aid data collection.7 9 The IPHC is responsible for establishing the
TAC for the Canada-U.S. commercial halibut fisheries and for agreeing
on and recommending to the two States their allocation of the TAC.
The Halibut Convention has had considerable success in protecting
the species. The IPHC reported in 2006 that the "halibut stock is healthy
in the central and southern portion of the range,"8 which covers the waters adjacent to British Columbia and the Pacific coast of the United
States. However, in 2008 the IPHC noted that the halibut stock had
reached a low point in its natural population cycle.8'
4. Hake/Whiting82
Canadian and U.S. scientists, fisheries managers and fishers have
been cooperating since the 1970s in establishing a TAC for Pacific
hake/whiting.83 A formal joint scientific assessment process was established in 1997.8 Despite these collaborative efforts, the two countries
were unable to agree on how to divide the TAC between them, with the
United States generally claiming 80% of the TAC and Canada claiming
30%.85
78.

Halibut Fishery Protocol, supra note 77, art. 1(3).

79.

Id. art. 111(3).

80.
Press Release, Int'l Pacific Halibut Comm'n, Halibut Commission Completes 2006
Annual Meeting (Jan. 23, 2006), available at www.iphc.washington.edu/halcomffnewsrel
2006/nr20060120.htm (last visited June 9, 2009).
81.
Press Release, Int'l Pacific Halibut Comm'n, Halibut Commission Completes 2008
Annual Meeting (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcon
newsrel/2008/nr20080122.htm (last visited June 9, 2009).
82.
Hake, the Canadian term, and whiting, the U.S. term, refer to the same species of
fish. Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from McDORMAN, supra note t,
at 316-17.
83.
David Balton, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Div. of Oceans and Fisheries, U.S. Dep't of
State, Comments to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Sept. 29, 2005), available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rm154128.htm (last visited June 9, 2009).
84.
Press Release, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada and the United States Sign
Treaty to Improve Stewardship of Pacific Hake (Nov. 21, 2003), availableat http://www.dfompo.gc.ca/media/npress-communique/2003/pr66-eng.htm (last visited June 9, 2009).
85.
Balton, supra note 83.
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In November 2003, Canada and the United States finalized the
Hake/Whiting Agreement, which came into force in 2008.6 The Agreement applies to all hake/whiting located in U.S. and Canadian Pacific
coast waters, except for the stock found in Puget Sound and the Strait of
Georgia. On the sharing of the TAC, the Agreement establishes that the
U.S. allocation is to be 73.88% and the Canadian allocation 26.12%.87
While the Hake/Whiting Agreement sets out the allocation shares,
the TAC will still need to be determined annually. This will be undertaken through a complex process involving four distinct but interactive
bodies88 designed to ensure that the input and advice from scientists,
fishers, and other interested parties is taken into consideration.
5. Albacore Tuna89
The 1981 Canada-U.S. Albacore Tuna Treaty 9 is different than the
above fishery agreements and arrangements. The 1981 Agreement principally established reciprocal fishing rights that placed no restrictions on
the number of vessels from either State that could operate in the waters
of the other State and similarly no restrictions on the total amount of albacore tuna that could be taken by these vessels. Visiting vessels were
required, however, to meet registration and reporting requirements. 9' The
principal reason for this difference from the other agreements is that in
1981, when the Albacore Tuna Agreement was completed, the United
States was of the view that tuna, a highly migratory species, was not subject to the jurisdiction of a coastal State within its 200-nautical-mile
fishing zone.92 Thus, the 1981 Agreement was negotiated with the goal of
respecting Canada's view that tuna was subject to Canadian 200nautical-mile jurisdiction, whereas the U.S. view was that tuna was not
subject to such jurisdiction. In 1991, the United States joined the rest of
the world in accepting that all marine living resources within 200nautical-mile zones, including tuna, were subject to the exclusive authority of the adjacent coastal State. 93
86.
See Agreement on Pacific Hake/Whiting, U.S.-Can., Nov. 21, 2003, S. TREATY
Doc. No. 108-24 (2004).
87.
Id. art. 111(2).
88.
Id. art. II.
89.
Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from McDORMAN, supra
note t, at 314-16.
90.
Treaty on Pacific Coast Albacore Tuna Vessels and Port Privileges, U.S.-Can., May
26, 1981, 33 U.S.T. 615, 1274 U.N.T.S. 247.
91.
Id. Annex AI 1,4.
92.
See William Burke, Highly Migratory Species in the New Law of the Sea, 14
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 273, 303-10 (1984).
93.
Environment and Other Transnational Scientific Issues: Protection of the Marine
Environment and Marine Conservation: Environment: Marine Wildlife: Highly Migratory
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Complaints by U.S. fishers that Canadian vessels were "overcrowding" the U.S. fishing grounds and that albacore tuna stock migration had
resulted in Canadians receiving "disproportionate benefits" under the
1981 Treaty led the United States to initiate negotiations to amend the
Treaty." The 2002 Amendment to the 1981 Treaty 9 resulted in fishing
vessels from each State now only being allowed into the other State's
waters for a limited amount of time per year, although there remains no
restriction on harvest levels. The Albacore Tuna Treaty, however, is
presently the only Canada-U.S. fisheries agreement that creates reciprocal fishing rights for the vessels of each State in the waters of the other.
B. TransboundaryFisheriesEnforcement96
In the years immediately following the Gulf of Maine Case,97 there
were a significant number of U.S. fishing vessels allegedly crossing the
boundary line into Canadian waters to fish illegally, and, when chased,
avoiding arrest by crossing back into U.S. waters.9" Similarly, on the Pacific coast, there were a number of Canadian fishers in the Juan de Fuca
Strait area darting into U.S. waters and then using Canadian waters as a
haven from U.S. prosecution.99 The issue came to a head in the Gulf of
Maine in 1989 when Canadian and U.S. vessels collided and a cannon
shot was fired across the bow of a fleeing U.S. fishing vessel.i"
The 1989 incident and the general problem of illegal cross-boundary
fishing activity led to the 1990 Canada-United States Fisheries Enforcement Agreement.'0 ' Pursuant to the Agreement, the two States made it an
offense under their national laws to fish in the waters of the other State
Fish: U.S. Inclusion of Highly Migratory Tuna Under U.S. EEZ Jurisdiction, 1991-1999

DIGEST § 13(A)(4)(a)(4)(i), at 1707-08.
94.
Letter of Submittal from Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, to George Bush, President of
the United States (Oct. 9, 2002) in S. TREATY Doc. No. 108-1, at V-VI (2003).
95.
Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Amending the Treaty on Pacific
Coast Albacore Tuna Vessels and Port Privileges, U.S.-Can., Aug. 21, 2002, Sept. 10, 2002, S.

Doc. No. 108-1 (2003).
96.
Paragraphs in this section are drawn, with modification, from McDORMAN, supra
note t, at 150-51.
TREATY

97.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
98.
Parsons, supra note 37, at 334; Glen J. Herbert, FisheriesRelations in the Gulf of
Maine: Implications of an Arbitrated Maritime Boundary, 19 MARINE POL'Y 301, 311-13
(1995); Allen L. Springer, Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbours? The Gulf of Maine Revisited, 6 INT'L ENVTL Arr. 223, 229 (1994).

99.

Springer, supra note 98, at 229.

100.
See GeorgesBank Spawns Anger, CALGARY HERALD, Dec. 13, 1989, at A15; Deborah Jones, Deal Signed to End U.S.-Canada FisheriesWar, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 27, 1990,
at B4. See generally John Lavers & Ian Stewart, Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement, in
CANADIAN OCEAN LAW AND POLICY 173, 182-83 (David VanderZwaag ed., 1992).
101.
Agreement on Fisheries Enforcement, U.S.-Can., Sept. 26, 1990, T.I.A.S. No.
11753, 1852 U.N.T.S. 73.
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without authorization.' 02This obligation simultaneously respects territorialism (a State can only directly enforce within its territory) and
undermines territorialism (by ensuring that a fisher of one State will be
prosecuted and punished for illegal activity in the other State). Another
part of the 1990 Agreement obliges the two States to consult concerning
the Agreement's implementation, including as regards "standard fisheries law enforcement practices in the vicinity of maritime boundaries."'' 3
This has resulted in yearly meetings of Canadian and U.S. officials and
has enhanced enforcement cooperation. It is worth noting that Article V
of the 1990 Agreement specifically reaffirms the commitment of both
States "to ensure full respect for the maritime boundaries between them
delimited by mutual agreement or third-party dispute settlement, including by the International Court of Justice.""' This clause was clearly
aimed at U.S. east coast fishing constituencies and stakeholders who remained unhappy with their lost gamble on the Gulf of Maine boundary.
The 1990 Agreement is seen as a success, based on the few instances
of fishers of one State being arrested by the other in or near the CanadaU.S. maritime boundaries. 5
C. FishingActivities in Disputed Waters

There are overlapping 200-nautical-mile maritime claims between
Canada and the United States, including waters: in the Beaufort Sea
(Arctic Ocean); seaward of the Strait of Juan de Fuca and adjacent to the
state of Washington and province of British Columbia; in the Dixon Entrance (separating the Queen Charlotte Islands of British Columbia and
the Alexander Archipelago of Alaska), and seaward of Dixon Entrance
out to 200 nautical miles; seaward of the maritime boundary within the
Gulf of Maine; and adjacent to Machias Seal Island and North Rock located near the Maine and New Brunswick border in the inner Gulf of
Maine.
Only in two of the disputed areas have fisheries figured prominently:
the Dixon Entrance and around Macias Seal Island. Of the remaining
areas, the areas in dispute seaward of the Juan de Fuca Strait and seaward of Dixon Entrance are not large; there is no significant fishing
activity in the Beaufort Sea at present; and though the disputed area seaward of the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Maine is a combination of

102.

Id. art. I.

103.
104.

Id. art. 11(c).
Id. art. V.

105.

Dawn Russell et al, Fisheriesand Shellfish Sanitation, in DEP'T OF FISHERIES AND

OCEANS, OVERVIEW

OF CURRENT GOVERNANCE IN THE BAY OF FUNDY/GULF OF MAINE:

TRANSBOUNDARY COLLABORATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND INITIATIVES

55, 68-69 (2006).
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fishing zone and extended continental shelf, the issue has not raised
much public controversy.
As regards fishing activity in the disputed zones, Canada and the
United States operate based on an understanding that each State will enforce its fisheries laws against its own vessels and not against the vessels
of the other State, an agreement commonly referred to as flag State enforcement.
Specifically regarding the disputed waters in the Dixon Entrance,
where the Canada-U.S. boundary dispute dates back to the 1903 Alaska
Boundary Arbitration,'°6 the two States exchanged notes in August 1980
reaffirming that each side would observe flag State enforcement respecting fisheries.0 7
Machias Seal Island and North Rock are the only non-submerged
lands over which there is a sovereignty dispute between Canada and the
United States.08 Because of the disputed sovereignty over the islets,
there is an area of overlapping maritime claims adjacent to the islands of
approximately 210 square nautical miles."° Canada and the United States
agreed to exclude the question of the sovereignty over and the sea area
adjacent to Machias Seal Island and North Rock from the Gulf of Maine
Case, so this issue remains unsettled."
Since the early 1970s, Canada and the United States have informally
agreed upon a policy of flag State enforcement regarding fishing activity
within the disputed waters adjacent to Machias Seal Island and North
Rock."' This has generally operated to avoid significant bilateral fisheries problems. However, in 2002, Canadian concerns about decreasing
lobster catches and alleged increases in U.S. fishing effort in the disputed area put lobster fishing on the bilateral agenda."' However,
increased availability of lobster and adjusted harvesting activities has
resulted in a degree of calm settling on the Canada-U.S. lobster fishery
adjacent to Machias Seal Island in recent years.
106.
See Decision of the Alaska Boundary Tribunal Under the Treaty of 24 January1903
Between the United States and Great Britain, Oct. 20, 1903; Proceedings of the Alaska
Boundary Tribunal, S. Doc. No. 162/1 (1903); see also MCDORMAN, supra note t, at 163-68.
107.
See U.S. Department of State, 1981-1988 CUMULATIVE DIGEST, at 1930.
108.
McDORMAN, supra note t, at 191-92.
109.
David H. Gray, Canada's Unresolved Maritime Boundaries, 48 GEOMATICA 131,
140(1994).
110.
See Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 6, paras. 20, 211.
111.
See Judicial Settlement: The International Court of Justice, 1973 DIGEST §3, at 466.
112.
See Beverly Cook, Lobster Boat Diplomacy: The Canada-USGrey Zone, 29 MAR.
POL'Y 385-90 (2005); Joan Marshall, Defining Maritime Boundaries: "The Murky Hand of
History's Oversight" in the Gulf of Maine, 48 CANADIAN GEOGRAPHER 266, 277-78 (2004);
Dept. of Fisheries & Oceans Canada, The Machias Seal Island Lobster Fishery
(LFA 38b), BACKGROUNDER, June 30, 2004, http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communications/
maritimes/back03e/B-MAR-03-(4E).html (last visited June 6, 2009).
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CONCLUSION

Fortunately, Canada and the United States have had more successes
than failures respecting transboundary fishery resource cooperation.
How beneficial this cooperation has been for the resources in question is
debatable, but it has resulted in fisheries matters not being high on the
bilateral Canada-U.S. political agenda.
The fundamental construct of Canada-U.S. fisheries cooperation respects the territorialist paradigm and the international legal reality that
within a State's 200-nautical-mile zone, that State has exclusive authority as regards marine living resources. Thus, the fishers of each State can
operate only in national waters and direct at-sea enforcement can take
place only in national waters. The exception to this is the Albacore Tuna
Treaty, where there is reciprocal access of fishers into the waters of each
State.
Nevertheless, territorial subversion does occur, in that the cooperative arrangements for transboundary fisheries in the Gulf of Maine and
for salmon, halibut, and hake/whiting in the Pacific Ocean all involve
mechanisms that require bodies composed of both Canadian and U.S.
members jointly to establish TACs and/or catch limits and other management measures (for example gear restrictions) for the species across
the boundary area. Thus, to a degree, the science and management activities transcend territorialism. Depending on the underlying agreement,
these joint bodies recommend to the two States the share of the TAC that
each State should receive and the management measures each should
adopt. The formal adoption by the States of the recommendations and the
activities of fishing and enforcement remain strictly based on territorialism. The 1990 Fisheries Enforcement Agreement, however, does a good
job of "subverting" territorialism by having each State accept in its national law that it is an offense to fish illegally in the other State's waters.
The failed 1979 East Coast Fishery Agreement, an innovative attempt to disregard national boundaries both for the purposes of
management but also as regards fishing activities, was vetoed by the affected U.S. fishing constituencies and stakeholders who preferred the
certainty of a territorialist approach-i.e., a maritime boundary. The failure to achieve bilateral cooperation on Pacific salmon in the 1990s was
primarily driven by fishing constituencies and stakeholders pressing conflicting property and territorialist views.
More optimistically, subsequent decades in Canada-U.S. fishery relations has seen a change in rhetoric and expectations away from
national sovereignty. The acquisitive aspects of the 200-nautical-mile
zone and, in the case of Pacific salmon, the State-of-origin concept, have
given way to a cooperative ethic on cross-boundary fisheries matters in-
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creasingly motivated by the assessment by governing managers and the
fishing industries in both countries that without bilateral cooperation
there will be a further decline of cross-boundary stocks.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the resources in question, fish, significantly challenge the territorialist paradigm, Canada and the United
States, driven and supported by the fishing constituencies and stakeholders
most effected, have embraced territorialism in bilateral cooperation. The
degree of subversion that exists is important but ultimately, from a legal
perspective, not that significant. Hence, Canada-United States Cooperative
Approaches to Shared Marine Fishery Resources: Territorial Subversion?
Not really.

